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EL REGRESO DEL MALÓN.  
UN ACERCAMIENTO CUANTITATIVO  
A LAS INCURSIONES INDÍGENAS EN LAS PAMPAS
 The goal of this article is to systematize 
the existing information about the inter-ethnic 
malones in the Southern Frontier between 
the years of 1860 and 1875, on the eve of 
the so-called “conquest of the desert”. We set 
out to identify the incursions that took place 
during the period, observing their occurrence 
in different frontier areas, the different parti-
cipating leaders and groups, the amount of 
warriors, and the results they had regarding 
the appropriation of cattle and captives. With 
this information, we tried to build an overview 
about the indigenous incursions in the totality 
of the frontiers. That is why we sidelined the 
analysis of the political dynamics characteristic 
of the different frontier regions, prioritizing 
the observation of global aspects. But it is 
precisely from the treatment of the borders 
as a whole that we can risk some hypotheses 
about aspects of the indigenous policies.
Malones - Mapuche - Pampas - Southern 
Frontier - Argentina - XIX Century - Puelmapu
Malones - Mapuche - Pampas - Frontera Sur 
- Siglo XIX - Puelmapu
 El objetivo de este artículo es sistematizar 
ºla información existente sobre los malones 
interétnicos en la Frontera Sur entre los años 
1860 y 1875, en vísperas de la llamada “con-
quista del desierto”. Para ello nos propusimos 
identificar las incursiones ocurridas durante el 
período observando su ocurrencia en diferentes 
áreas fronterizas, los distintos líderes y agrupa-
ciones participantes, la cantidad de guerreros 
y sus resultados en cuanto a la apropiación 
de ganado y cautivos. Con esa información 
intentamos construir un panorama general 
sobra las incursiones indígenas a la totalidad de 
las fronteras. Por ello pusimos entre paréntesis 
el análisis de las dinámicas políticas propias de 
los diferentes espacios fronterizos priorizando 
la observación de aspectos globales. Pero es 
precisamente a partir del tratamiento de las 
fronteras en conjunto que podremos arriesgar 
algunas hipótesis sobre aspectos de la política 
indígena que habrían quedado oscurecidos 
en una mirada acotada a un espacio o grupo 
en particular.
1 “Conquest of the desert” is the name that has traditionally been given to the military campaigns carried out between 
 1878 and 1884 that culminated with the definitive occupation of the southern territory the Argentine State claimed as its own. 
2 Some of the most influential being José Manuel Olascoaga, Estudio Topográfico de la pampa y el río negro (Buenos Aires: 
 Eudeba [1880] 1974) and Estanislao Zeballos, La conquista de 15.000 leguas. Ensayo para la ocupación definitiva 
 de la Patagonia (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente, [1878] 2008), all of them participants of the expansion 
 campaigns. Already in the 20th century, Juan Carlos Whalter, La conquista del desierto (Buenos Aires: Eudeba 
 [1949] 1973). Nevertheless, more recently, works with this perspective, for example Norberto Ras, La guerra por las vacas 
 (Buenos Aires: Galerna 2007), have continued to be published, which continues to dominate non-academic approaches.
3 In a narrow and therefore unjust list, the contributions of Martha Bechis, Piezas de Etnohistoria del sur sudamericano 
 (Madrid: CSIC, 2008); Piezas de Etnohistoria y de antropología histórica (Buenos Aires: SAA, 2011); Julio Vezub, 
 Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas. Poder y etnicidad en la Patagonia Septentrional 
 (Buenos Aires: Prometeo libros, 2009); Ingrid de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de la organización 
 nacional.”, in De los cacicazgos a la ciudadanía. Sistemas políticos en la frontera, siglos XVIII-XIX, edited by Mónica 
 Quijada. (Berlín: Gebr Mann Verlag, 2011); “Entre el malón, el comercio y la diplomacia: Dinámicas de 
 la política indígena en las fronteras pampeanas. Siglos XVIII y XIX. Un balance historiográfico”, in Revista Tiempo 
 Histórico 6/11 (Santiago 2016): 17-40; Ingrid de Jong y Guido Cordero, “El malón en contrapunto: dinámicas de la 
 diplomacia, el comercio y la guerra en la Frontera Sur (s. XVIII y XIX)”, in Los saqueos en la historia argentina. Variaciones 
 de una acción colectiva, edited by Gabriel Di Meglio et al. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI), 63-89; Daniel Villar and Juan 
 Francisco Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra: conflictos indígenas y circuitos de intercambio”, in Las fronteras hispano 
 criollas del mundo indígena latinoamericano en los siglos XVIII y XIX, compiled by Raúl Mandrini et al. (Neuquén, 
 Bahía Blanca, Tandil: UNC, UNS, UniCen 2003); Daniel Villar y Juan Francisco Jiménez, “Amigos, hermanos 
 y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de la Pampa Oriental (1820-1840). Etnogénesis Llailmache”, 
 in Amigos, hermanos y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de la Pampa Oriental (S XIX), edited by 
 Daniel Villar et al. (Bahía Blanca: CDP-UNS, 2011); Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: historia del pueblo mapuche en la 
 época colonial (San Pedro de Atacama: IIAM, 2007); Leonardo León Solís, Maloneros y conchavadores en la Araucanía y 
 las Pampas. 1780-1800 (Temuco: Universidad de la Frontera, 1990); Marcela Tamagnini and Graciana Perez, El fondo de la tierra. 
 Destinos errantes en la frontera sur (Río Cuarto: Editorial de la URC, 2010); Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, De la inclusión a la exclusión. 
 La formación del estado, la nación y el pueblo mapuche (Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Santiago de Chile, 2000) can’t be ignored.
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IntRoductIon
The malones or Indian invasions, quick war operations aimed at capturing cattle and captives, 
occupied until few decades ago a cen-
tral place in the historiography about 
indigenous groups of the Pampas and 
northern Patagonia in the period before 
to the so-called “conquest of the desert”1. 
These were reconstructions, made from 
a fundamentally military perspective, 
which contributed to the configuration 
of an epic tale, destined to legitimize the 
territorial expansion of the Argentine 
state2. From the beginning of the 1980s, 
new perspectives provided by the fields of 
anthropology and history have modified 
the picture. These contributions have 
broadened our knowledge of indigenous 
groups, the process of state expansion, and 
frontier spaces, incorporating the analyses 
of numerous dimensions sidestepped by 
the traditional approach, like diplomatic 
ties, indigenous participation in creole 
conflicts, the long-standing presence of 
indios amigos in the vicinity of cristianas 
populations, and the trade3. Likewise, the 
historiographic fracture between the east 
and west of the Andes mountain range 
–currently Chile and Argentina– that 
does not reflect the unique nature of the 
Mapuche indigenous space prior to the 
conquest campaigns has also begun to be 
demolished.
This reconfiguration of the country 
side undoubtedly modified the traditional 
way of conceiving indigenous incursions. 
These ceased to be thought of as a constant 
presence on the borders to be analyzed as 
part of concrete historical processes, which 
included other types of non-violent ties. 
The unilateral character with which the 
stereotype of the malón carried indigenous 
societies introduced cristiana violence, 
previously relegated by researchers. The 
“irrationality” attributed to the malón 
4 Regarding this issue, the seminal works of Raúl Mandrini, “La agricultura indígena en la región pampeana y sus adyacencias 
 (siglos XVII-XIX)”, Anuario IEHS 1 (Tandil 1986); “Desarrollo de una sociedad indígena pastoril en el área interserrana 
 bonaerense”, Anuario del IEHS 2 (Tandil 1987); “Las transformaciones de la economía indígena bonaerense (1600-1820)”, 
 in Huellas en la tierra. Indios, agricultores y hacendados en la pampa bonaerense, R. Mandrini y A. Reguera (eds.), (Tandil: 
 IEHS/UNCPBA, 1994); “¿Sólo de caza y robos vivían los indios? La organización económica de los cacicatos pampeanos del 
 siglo xix”, in Siglo XIX. Revista de Historia, 2a época, 15 (México 1994) as well as more recent contributions by Sebastián 
 Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá: Economía y Política del Cacicato Salinero (1853-1859)”, en Amigos, hermanos 
 y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de la Pampa Oriental (SXIX), D. Villar, y J. F. Jiménez, (ed.). (Bahía Blanca: 
 Centro de Documentación Patagónica, Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2011), can be mentioned.
5 A traditional scheme on indigenous incursions in the Pampas links them with trade on the Mapuche-Chilean borders. This perspective 
 has been relativized by Sebastián Alioto, Indios y ganado en la frontera. La ruta del río Negro (1750-1830) (Rosario: Prohistoria 
 2011) and Guido Cordero, Malón y política. Loncos y weichafes en la frontera sur (1860-1875) (Rosario: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2019).
77
Guido Cordero.
Año 10 / N°19 / julio-diciembre 2019.
gave rise to political and economic con-
siderations. Regarding the latter, a less 
simplistic view of indigenous production 
was leaving the notion of “predation” to 
give rise to the analysis of pastoral and 
agricultural practices east of the Andes, 
previously denied4.
The relevance attributed to the 
malones in the indigenous economy of 
the Pampas, and of the pan-Mapuche 
area in general, however, has just begun 
to be questioned. Additionally, the nature 
and volume of the trade that linked the 
Pampas with Araucanía, and the role of 
the malones in them, is also the subject 
of discussion5. We do not, however, 
have quantitative studies that allow us 
to measure the effects of the incursions, 
both in their economic face and in their 
consequences on border populations, 
to support the views on this. Was the 
malón a central aspect of the Mapuche 
economy of the Pampas, expressed in a 
regular practice? Was it a practice linked 
to regional cattle circuits or was it linked 
to the consumption of attackers? And 
going beyond its economic aspect, did 
it express a homogeneous and concerted 
response to Christians or should it be 
thought of in terms of political projects 
of different groups? How did they relate 
to the socio-political logic of indigenous 
groups? We believe that these and other 
questions may be better thought in light 
of systematic data that have not yet been 
constructed.
The objective of this article, then, 
is to systematize the existing information 
about the inter-ethnic malones in the 
Southern Frontier between the years of 
1860 and 1875, on the eve of the ex-
pedition that expanded the borderline, 
making a definitive turn on the relative 
military equilibrium that up until then 
had characterized the relations between 
the indigenous groups and the Argentine 
state. To achieve this, we set out to iden-
tify the incursions that took place during 
the period, observing their occurrence 
in different frontier areas, the different 
participating leaders and groups, the 
amount of warriors, and the results they 
had regarding the appropriation of cattle 
and captives. With this information, 
we tried to build an overview about the 
indigenous incursions in the totality of 
the borders. That is why we sidelined 
the analysis of the political dynamics 
characteristic of the different frontier 
regions, prioritizing the observation of 
global aspects. But it’s precisely from the 
treatment of the borders as a whole that 
we can risk some hypotheses about aspects 
of the indigenous policies that would’ve 
been left in the dark with a limited look 
at a space or group in particular. 
6 Between 1852 and 1862 the province of Buenos Aires and the rest of the provinces that make up the Republic of Argentina made 
 up two autonomous states, confronted against each other. They were not published in the year 1867 The year 1875, on the other hand, 
 is less complete that the preceding years, due to a revolution taking place the year before, coincidentally with the change of government.
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The article is organized in four 
parts, followed by a general recapitulation 
in which we develop some conclusions 
and hypotheses. In the first part, we will 
show, in the highest level of generality, 
the number of incursions to the whole of 
the northern frontier of the indigenous 
territory. Subsequently we will unbundle 
this accounting of malones, proposing an 
operative classification that will allow us 
to problematize and go in depth over the 
initially presented scene. Thirdly, we will 
differentiate between distinct areas in the 
borders and ascriptions of the maloneros, 
anticipating some hypotheses about the 
indigenous policy in the period, which we 
will get back to at the end. Lastly, we will 
try to quantify the effects of the indigenous 
incursions in regards to appropriation of 
cattle, capture of prisoners, and homicides 
among the rural population and the Chris-
tian settlers. Before introducing ourselves 
into the body of our presentation, it will 
be necessary to make some methodological 
specifications. 
methodologIcAl clARIfIcAtIons
An analysis based on quantitative 
data like the one we are attempting here 
implies a series of difficulties in relation to 
the available sources. That is why we have 
put special care in explicitly stating the 
different problems we encountered. This 
article has been elaborated on the basis 
of two primary sources: the Fronteras con 
los Indios fund, belonging to the Servicio 
Histórico del Ejército (SHE), and the 
Reports of the Ministry of War and Navy 
(Memorias del Ministerio de Guerra y Ma-
rina, MMGM) presented to the national 
legislature between the years 1863 and 
1876. The Fronteras con los Indios fund is 
made up of forty-seven boxes, from which 
thirty-five correspond to the period that 
concerns us. Each one of them holds a 
variable number of documents that goes 
from half a hundred to a little over two 
hundred. 
The MMGM are publications 
presented by the executive power at 
the beginning of each legislative year in 
which the state of forces of the country, 
the internal and external military avatars 
and the situation of the so-called “internal 
frontiers” were summarized. A general 
part was followed by a series of annexes 
in which documentation serving as do-
cumentary evidence of what was affirmed 
by the minister was transcribed. These 
annexes in particular were the ones we 
found useful. 
The notes and reports published 
in the MMGM and the ones we have 
gathered in the SHE are not equivalent, 
which could answer to various causes. 
The MMGM do not cover all the years 
we survey, given that they started to be 
published after the unification of the 
country that followed the battle of Pavón, 
and they were not published in one of the 
years we cover6. On the other side, in some 
cases the communications transcribed in 
the memories are altered in comparison to 
the originals in the SHE, for presumably 
7 This caused a modification of the original order, so documents that will show up here quoted as found in a particular 
 box might be found in other articles or books found in other boxes. We have opted to mention the documents according 
 to their number and box, which is the way in which we have mostly found the bibliography, even though the current 
 order of the archive is according to the box number followed by its order number. 
8 In this sense, the reduction of documents to serve political happenings that shook the frontiers, like during the mitrista 
 revolution of the year 1874 or the reorganization that followed the unification of the country, is notable. 
9 Some communications that are mentioned in the MMGM are found in some funds from the General Archive of the Nation.
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political reasons, although we consider 
this has been rather exceptional. 
The amount of malones we found 
registered in one source and not the other, 
and vice versa is to our understanding 
more notable. The documents saved in 
the SHE are sharply fragmented; they 
are notes, debriefings and reports of 
different kinds sent from all frontier 
military command headquarters that 
were subsequently unified in a single 
fund and ordered chronologically7. The 
annexes found in the MMGM regarding 
the malones, on the contrary, order those 
events of which the ministry wished to 
take account and that were summarized 
in its central exposition. In this sense, our 
search in the SHE functioned as a sort of 
“control” on the “official” incursions on the 
frontier, allowing us to add malones that 
for whatever reason were not informed by 
the ministry. However, we have also found 
incursions mentioned in the MMGM that 
did not appear in the documentation of 
the SHE, which warns us about a probable 
underreporting, the relevance of which is 
very difficult to estimate.
This underreporting in the SHE 
could answer to different motives. Part of 
the documents catalogued by the archive 
have been subtracted or lost. The fund 
reflects in an unbalance between notes 
sent by different commands. This might 
be because of the loss of documentation 
before the fund was constituted8, or because 
of it being sent to other offices from which 
they ended up making up the fund of 
other archives9. The underreporting of 
incursions does not affect them all the 
same way. The big malones, those that 
mobilized a significant number of warriors 
and had substantial effects on the frontier 
populations, are usually repeated in both 
the SHE and the MMGM. This does not 
seem at all surprising, given that precisely 
these ones are the events that generated 
the most notorious political and military 
repercussions. In that regard, we worked 
under the assumption that the most part 
of the unregistered incursions correspond 
to those of relatively minor importance. 
However, for the interpretation of the data 
we will show in this article, the utmost 
attention must be paid to this eventual 
sub estimation. 
This is not the only possible source 
of mistakes. In some cases, the documents 
present a detailed report of an indigenous 
incursion but, in most cases, the informa-
tion obtained is fragmentary. Written in 
the moment of returning from a persecu-
tion, during it or in the moment of being 
warned of the entry of maloneros to the 
frontier, the notes in numerous occasions 
only provide us with partial information 
that is not always followed in successive 
notes of better judgement. This generated 
various kinds of problems that we have 
tried to get through.
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In some occasions, the mobilization 
of the troops because of Indian entry 
resulted unnecessary because it did not 
actually come to be. This could have 
been a result of a retreat of the maloneros 
from being discovered without entering 
the towns or simply because of a false 
alarm. Sadly, we do not always count with 
chained communications that permit us 
to follow the direction of a partial data on 
the occurrence of a malón. This means that 
some warnings of “Indian invasion” that 
we count as malones could correspond to 
incursions that never happened. However, 
the fact that there are no later documents 
that confirm this warning does not mean 
we can rule out it happened. Before these 
situations, and there where our search in 
secondary sources and other archives have 
failed, we have opted to include them. 
Contrary to the underreporting already 
mentioned, this implies that in the data 
presented, incursions that never took place 
might appear, although, it is unlikely that 
this would happen with those of a certain 
magnitude. The decision to include them, 
also takes into account that the indigenous 
attacks have frequently been exaggerated 
by the traditional historiography. 
Another possible mistake in the 
systematization could consist in consi-
dering as different entries of the Indians 
that which is actually a sole attack, or the 
opposite: considering as a single malón 
what were independent happenings. In 
the first case, it could happen if it appears 
fractured in the sources by communications 
of frontier bosses, fort commanders or 
peace judges that had not communicated 
between them when writing down what 
had happened. In the opposite case, di-
fferent attacks are erroneously considered 
a coordinated action by those writing the 
documents we are working with. When 
we have enough documentation about 
a particular event this mistake is easy to 
avoid. When in doubt, however, we have 
preferred to count every attack as inde-
pendent, assuming the risk of registering 
more than there actually were.
We insist, in that the problems we 
are pointing out affect fundamentally 
the smallest malones, those we suspect 
are also underreported. We usually have 
more detailed information regarding the 
more important incursions. In all, big and 
small, we have looked to identify some 
variables: the number of malones, that we 
subtracted by the area where they took 
place and the moment they happened; the 
number of participants of the incursion, 
there where the sources have informed 
us; the effects on the frontier populations 
regarding cattle and prisoner capture, as 
well as death of civil population, military 
personal and maloneros; and the ascription 
that the sources attribute to the attacking 
people to some faction or cacicato.
The numbers resulting from our 
systematization should not be read as a 
definitive description of the inter-ethnic 
malones in this period. Some of the analy-
sed variables, like the number of warriors 
in one malón or the quantity of head of 
cattle taken, necessarily refer to approxi-
mate quantities. On the other side, they 
could also correspond to the voluntary 
distortion, falsification and subtraction of 
information destined to sustain the pres-
tige of the frontier authorities, aggravate 
their rivals or avoid the register of illegal 
or debatable practices.
Figure number 1.  
Malones between 1860 and 1875
Source: Compiled from SHE and MMGM.
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That is why we assume that the 
numbers that follow, constructed from 
the addition of approximate and tentative 
data, produced in circumstances and by 
authors in which the biases and defor-
mations were far from being exceptional, 
should not be considered definitive. They 
constitute, we hope, a good starting point 
to get to know some characteristics of the 
malones that would be harder to visualize 
without the global perspective we have 
adopted here. Lastly, a warning about the 
general order is due. The objective of this 
work is to carry out a systematization of 
the indigenous malones on the frontier 
populations. In this sense, we take the 
risk of reproducing an image of life on 
the frontier we object. The accounting of 
violent events might lead to sidestep the 
existence of other simultaneous forms of 
relation between Indians and cristianos 
and even reinforce the image of a radical 
conflict between both that does not follow 
from the complexity of life on the frontier.
Malones between 1860 And 1875
Firstly, we will make a note of the 
number of incursions that occurred during 
this period. We do not distinguish, for 
now, the area or locality in which it took 
place, or its significance. Between 1860 and 
1875, we recorded a total of 179 malones 
at different border points. Except for four 
of these fifteen years, the annual number 
of incursions shows a striking regularity 
close to 11 malones a year, in average. It 
is hard to determine how significant the 
underreporting was during those years 
in which we found the least incursions 
(1860, 1861 and 1863). It is possible, 
therefore, for the data with which we 
are working to be less exhaustive during 
those years. The growth of incursions in 
the year 1871, which in fact registered 
an important increase in conflict, could 
also reflect the circumstance. We have 
summarized them in Figure number 1.
10 In the case of two of the registered malones, we do not have a date beyond the year in which they happened. What follows, 
 then, refers to 183 malones. 
11 The “Chilean” term can refer to groups of the Araucanía or the east of the Andes mountain range. The presence of these groups, in the first 
 case, becomes important for the perspectives that assume the demand for cattle in Chile as the ultimate cause of the malones.
12 In a note from the commander of the Southern Frontier from 1866, there is a warning about the start of the “invasion season”, 
 referring to autumn (SHE, Box 19, Doc 3439). Commonly, however, it refers to spring. 
13 In January of 1866, the commander of Patagones informs having discharged the soldiers because of an impossibility 
 of an incursion during the summer (SHE, Box 19, Doc. 981). As seen in another note, from December 1871, this would be 
 because “the journeys they have to go through to steal in this season are an obstacle for them” (SHE, Box 34, Doc. 1289). 
14 This distinction was already present in texts contemporaneous to the validity of the frontier like Álvaro Barros, 
 Fronteras y territorios federales de las pampas del sur (Buenos Aires: Solar-Hachette, [1872] 1975.) and has been 
 retaken recently by authors such as Eduardo Crivelli Montero, “Malón, ¿Saqueo o estrategia?”, in Revista Todo es Historia 
 283 (Buenos Aires 1991). While recognize their analytic value, have questioned its usefulness de Sebastián Alioto, 
 Indios y ganado en la frontera. La ruta del río Negro (1750-1830) (Rosario: Prohistoria, 2011).  
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These malones were not distributed 
in a completely random way during the 
months of every year10. The “seasonal” 
nature of the indigenous incursions has 
already been pointed out in the literature 
about the frontiers. It is generally attribu-
ted to the importance of the “Chilean”11 
contingents –coming from the Araucanía 
or the cordillera’s eastern foothills– in the 
maloneras forces, who spent the winter in 
the Pampas and participated in incursions 
preferably during the spring so they could 
return before the next winter began. In the 
sources, the “malón season” is occasionally 
mentioned, though they do not always 
agree in the months to which this refers12. 
Without a doubt, specific characteristics 
of the geographies at different points in 
the frontier will also acquire relevance 
regarding the possibility of making an 
incursion in certain moments of the year13. 
Indeed, there is a certain disproportion 
in the months of spring –37% of the 
malones happened between October and 
December– this, however, doesn’t exclude 
the other months, with a barely smaller 
proportion of incursions –specially in 
March, April and August–. On the other 
hand, while there are months evidently 
less represented in the incursions, fun-
damentally during the summer and the 
winter, there is no month in which they 
do not occur. 
Summarizing; the malones in the 
frontiers, taking into account the men-
tioned precautions, seem to have been 
quite regular during these years. This 
is remarkable considering that the cir-
cumstances and the diplomatic avatars 
between the different indigenous groups 
and the cristianos varied considerably in 
the course of these fifteen years. The first 
step we have taken in this section (the 
simple quantification of the incursions) 
has to be made more complex. Below we 
will start breaking down this first chart 
by the proposal of a first classification of 
the malones.
smAll, medIum-sIzed And bIg Malones
To advance another step we will 
propose an operative typology while there 
are various typological suggestions, both in 
traditional literature and in more recent one, 
the criteria we adopt here does not strictly 
fit any of them. The oldest, without a 
doubt, is the proposal to distinguish the 
malones depending on whether their ob-
jectives were “political” or “economical”, 
which results clearly impracticable with our 
sources –that rarely inform about the ob-
jectives of the maloneros– besides the diffi-
culties presented at attempting to establish 
a restricted delimitation between them14. 
15 Leonardo León Solís, “Conflictos de poder y guerras tribales en Araucanía y Las Pampas: La batalla de Tromen (1774)”, 
 in Historia 29 (Santiago 1995-1996): 185-233. 
16 Boccara, Los vencedores: historia del pueblo mapuche... 
17 Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra:...  
18 Sebastián Alioto and Juan Francisco Jiménez, “Transcripción de los apuntes de Zeballos con notas sobre su contenido 
 y léxico”, in Amigos, hermanos y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las sociedades indigenas de la Pampa Oriental (S. XIX), 
 edited by Villar y Jiménez (Bahía Blanca: CDP-UNS, 2011). The authors take both expressions from the transcriptions 
 of interviews made at the end of the 19th century to the cacique Namuncurá.   
19 Ingrid de Jong and Guido Cordero, “El malón en contrapunto: dinámicas de la diplomacia, el comercio y la guerra en la Frontera 
 Sur (s. XVIII y XIX)”, in Los saqueos en la historia argentina. Variaciones de una acción colectiva. Gabriel Di Meglio 
 and Sergio Serulnikov (ed). (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2017), 63-89. 
83
Guido Cordero.
Año 10 / N°19 / julio-diciembre 2019.
Other classifications, like León’s15 and 
Boccara’s16, seem a lot more fertile for the 
analysis of political processes both intra 
and inter-ethnic, but they don’t offer an 
adequate tool for what we intend to do in 
this article. In both cases, what’s proposed 
are tripartite classifications that, unfolded 
in a continuous, show different meanings 
in the motives behind the malón, as well 
as distinct intensities in effective violence, 
and in the political articulations both intra 
and inter-tribal needed for the passage of 
one category to the next17. However, the 
information we have is fragmented, which 
makes it difficult –or impossible– to get 
close to the concrete meanings that most 
part of the registered malones had, from the 
point of view of who carried them out. In 
the same way, only in a few cases we have 
evidence of the agreements and allegiances 
implied in the identified malones.
We’re inclined, instead, to use as a 
base to our typology an aspect that is also 
central in the analysis of the mentioned 
authors at the same time that is consis-
tent with the only “native” distinction 
with which we count to differentiate 
inter-ethnic malones: the cuero-tún –small 
attacks made to capture cattle without 
the participation of the cacicatos– and 
fta-que-malón –big malones– suggested 
by Alioto and Jiménez18. In short, we will 
distinguish the incursions according to the 
amount of warriors –conas – participant. 
With this, we are attempting to define the 
presence or lack thereof of big groups or 
coalitions, as well as leaderships of different 
significances. A big malón required the 
mobilization of a whole social machinery 
that from a start was only at the disposition 
of those big caciques –Futa Longko– that 
had constructed a big kinship network 
and political authority19. On the other 
extreme, small incursions of a couple 
dozens of warriors are hard to distinguish 
from the gangs of thieves that habitually 
acted in the frontier. 
Between these two big groups, we 
opted to incorporate a third that we will 
call “medium-sized” malones, from a lack 
of a better expression. Incursions in which, 
while the number of conas clearly exceeds 
what could correspond to a handful of 
allied families for an isolated sacking, it 
does not necessarily imply the degree of 
mobilization that is a necessary condition 
for the participation in a Futa Longko. In 
this way, the small malones –a handful of 
warriors, usually related–, the medium-
sized malones –an important number of 
maloneros, leaded by a cacique of a certain 
relevance– and the big malones –an attack 
of huge magnitude, necessarily organized 
with the approval and participation of the 
main caciques and generally expressing 
the allegiance of different groups– are 
20 Alioto, Indios y ganado en la frontera... 
Table Number 1.  
Big malones between 1860 and 1875
Amount of 
warriors 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1300 1500 2000 3700 5000
Number of 
malones 4 4 3 2 1 5 1 2 3 1 1
Source: Compiled from SHE and MMGM.
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presented to us as three modalities, preca-
riously distinguishable from one another 
with the documentation we work with.
The cuts between these three groups 
imply a certain degree of arbitrariness. For 
the first group we have taken the number of 
a hundred warriors, a number we consider 
that is capable of being summoned by a 
secondary longko, or capitanejo. A toldo 
was made up of more or less ten people, 
of which one or two approximately had 
possibilities of combating, which means 
that a hundred warriors equals around fifty 
families, a significant number but liable to 
respond to a capitanejo or minor cacique20. 
Either way, a hundred is the maximum 
number we accept in this category and 
is not the most frequently. In fact, 85% 
corresponds to malones of less than fifty 
warriors, which means, following the 
mentioned criteria, not more than twenty-
five families. With a hundred warriors, we 
identify 8 malones (10%), with between 
fifty and eighty warriors, 4 malones (5%), 
up to fifty warriors, 40 malones (49%). 
Lastly, in numerous communications they 
do not risk a concrete number, recurring 
to expressions like “a bunch of Indians”, 
“a small party”, a “small group”, etc. We 
include all these events under the group 
of small malones and they constitute a 
total of 29 malones (36%).
For the second group we have 
considered all the malones bigger than 
the previous as long as they did not get 
to five hundred warriors. In 48% (13) of 
the medium-sized malones participated 
between two and three hundred warriors, 
in 37% (10) between three hundred and 
four hundred and in 10% (4) between 
100 and one hundred and fifty.
Lastly, we have considered as “big 
malones” all of those that mobilized at 
least five hundred warriors. In the big 
malones the differences in magnitude 
between malones are also a lot bigger in 
this group: from the lower limit of five 
hundred warriors estimated, that suppose 
the authority of caciques of a certain im-
portance, to the highest extreme of this 
slot in which we registered malones with 
three thousand and seven hundred and five 
thousand conas , that necessarily implicate 
the organization of various main caciques 
in allegiance. In the table number 1 we 
summarize the big malones that we have 
registered according to their size:
Figure Number 2:  
Big, medium-size and small malones between 1860 and 1875
Source: Compiled from SHE and MMGM.
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From the total of 179 malones, then, 
we have identified 81 small ones (42%), 
27 medium-sized ones (15%) and 27 big 
ones (15%) It is necessary to mention that 
we do not have estimations on the number 
of warriors for all of the malones, thus 
the 44 remaining (25%) correspond to 
incursions on which the sources do not 
risk an estimation. As mentioned, either 
way, we suppose the in most cases they 
are small malones, or alarms that did not 
result in a real incursion. However, we 
have preferred counting them apart given 
that in some punctual cases where we do 
not have a number on the warriors, other 
elements present in the documents –like 
a big number of animals appropriated or 
references to “a great number of Indians” 
or “a great party”– seem to point towards 
medium-sized or big malones.  We have 
summarized this data in Figure number 2:
As we can see, in most of the years 
what predominates are small malones, 
or those on which we do not have data, 
probably corresponding mostly to that 
same group, considering we have also 
pointed out that those might be affected 
by an underresgister that is difficult to 
determine. These small malones seem to 
have increased their frequency during 
the decade of 1870, or they were better 
represented in the sources during that 
decade. Either way, their regularity seems 
more marked than that of the other two 
groups, which still present this certain 
stability we have observed when putting 
them together. We believe this happens 
because they reflect an autonomous dy-
namic, to a certain point, of the state of 
political relations between cristianos and 
Indians or, at least, with the main leaders 
of these last ones. 
21 Julio Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas. Poder y etnicidad en la Patagonia Septentrional 
 (Buenos Aires: Prometeo libros, 2009). This does not mean, however, that some warriors from the manzanas could not have 
 participated in incursions during this period.  
22 The malones in which pehuenches are mentioned during this period are few, of the 6 malones occurred in the south 
 of Mendoza, 3 were attributed to this group: In August of 1869, a group of 300 warriors accompanied by creole and 
 Chilean bandits (MMGM 1871:240-269); in June of 1871, an incursion whose leadership is attributed to the cacique Purrán 
 (MMGM 1872:27-33); and in December of 1873 with a small party leaded by the cacique Udalman (SHE Box35 Doc. 1204).
23 De Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período…” 
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We may now resume the question 
of the seasonal nature: The occurrence of 
medium-sized and big malones was a lot 
more accentuated during the spring and 
the autumn, besides presenting months 
where in fifteen years incursions of that 
size did not happen. It is possible that this 
obeys to the presence of extra-Pampeano 
allies in malones of more importance and 
reflects the regional circuits of cattle better, 
although certainly not with exactitude. 
The small malones, in contrast, besides 
being as we have seen the most numerous, 
result harder to associate to a particular 
time of the year. While a somehow bigger 
proportion can be observed during the 
same months as the other incursions, 
the small malones occur during the entire 
year. We believe this is consistent with 
their autonomy regarding allegiances 
and strategies of the cacicatos and their 
opportunistic and anarchic nature. 
Besides the seasonality, we have seen 
up to this point an accentuated predomi-
nance of small malones, and malones on 
which we have no data, that we mostly 
include in those. We have observed as well 
that these groups seem to be less stable 
in time than other types of incursions, 
and we attribute this to their autonomy 
regarding their partialities of belonging 
and political strategies of these and of 
their leaders. This autonomy, of course, 
did not stop the cuero-tún from having 
consequences in the frontier politics. The 
medium-sized and big malones, in contrast, 
continue to show a certain regularity with 
the passing of the years that requires a 
second step of problematization.
the “sAlIneRo” And “RAnquel” boRdeRs
Up until now, we have presented 
the incursions as coming from a homo-
geneous actor: indigenous society, even 
though we know that during this period 
it was politically multi-centre and its di-
fferent fractions did not develop a way of 
unambiguous relation with the Christian 
governments. In this way, the manzaneros 
of the patagonic north maintained peace 
during that whole period21. While the 
pehuenches of the south of what is now the 
Mendoza territory participated in certain 
occasions of incursions22, they seem to 
have had a secondary role during those 
years with respect to the main groups of 
the Pampa: the Salineros, leaded by the 
Futa Longko Calfucurá until his death in 
1873, and the Ranqueles. We know both 
had variable and not always coinciding 
strategies during those fifteen years23 To 
these central actors it’s also necessary to 
add the autonomous actions of groups 
of smaller size, referenced formally in the 
big caciques, Ranqueles or Salineros or, as 
is the case of Pincén, that will become 
24 A deep analysis on the trajectory of this cacique and his group, comparable with the one made on some of his contemporaries, 
 is a debt for current historiography. 
25 They are 23 small malones, 14 medium-sized ones, 14 big ones and 5 with no data on size.  
26 There are some significant exceptions to this statement. In December of 1867 and April of 1868 two malones, of 300 
 and 2000 conas respectively were attributed exclusively to Calfucurá in the south of Córdoba. This seems noteworthy 
 because of the good ties the cacique had with the cristianos at that time, besides of how infrequent actions of that magnitude, 
 in solitary, far from their own frontier territoriality, were. If in the first case the attribution might be a mistake from the 
 frontier commander, the big malón of 1868 seems even stranger: the piece of information about the leadership of Calfucurá 
 comes from captive soldiers that were liberated with the express order of informing the authorities that he was the one 
 conducting the invasion. While we do not count on any other element of judgement, we suspect that this might have been 
 a strategy destined to intervene in the pacific relations of the Salineros, maybe originated in the Ranqueles (MMGM 1868 
 Annexe F:LI-LII and LIV-LVI). A third malón is attributed to Calfucurá in Córdoba, in 1871. This is probably due to a mistake 
 from the person who wrote the note because, in fact, it is followed by a punitive expedition on the Ranqueles (MMGM 1871:283-290).
27 Graciana Pérez Zavala, Tratados de paz en las pampas: los ranqueles y su devenir político, 1850-1880 (Río Cuarto: Aspha, 2014).
28 Ingrid de Jong, “El negocio de la paz: la trayectoria diplomática de Calfucurá (1860-1873)” in Pueblos indígenas, conformación 
 de los estados nacionales y fronteras. Tensiones y paradojas de los procesos de transición contemporáneos en América Latina, compiled 
 by Hugo Trinchero, Luis Campos y Sebastián Valverde. (Buenos Aires: UACH and FFyL- UBA, 2014); Marcela Tamagnini 
 and Graciana Perez, El fondo de la tierra. Destinos errantes en la frontera sur (Río Cuarto: Editorial de la URC, 2010). 
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important from 1870 on, conducing a 
group independent of both24.
To distinguish the presence of di-
fferent groups or leaders in the malones, 
however, is not always an easy deed. Only 
on 57 (32%) of the noted malones, the 
person who wrote the source mentioned 
who were the supposed invaders25. In 
those, the attribution of the maloneros to 
a group or leader usually matches that one 
closer to the attacked frontiers: Ranqueles 
in the Buenos Aires north, Santa Fe, San 
Luis, Córdoba and Mendoza frontiers, 
and Salineros in the western and southern 
Buenos Aires frontiers. This happens even 
in those malones that appear mentioned in 
other groups. Thus, when in the Buenos 
Aires frontiers the presence of Ranqueles, 
“Chileans”, indios amigos or of some of 
their leaders is noted, this always happens 
in incursions leaded by Calfucurá or other 
Salinero caciques. In a similar way, the 
malones in the other frontier are mostly 
attributed to the Ranqueles, be it by 
themselves or accompanied by “Chileans”, 
capitanejos or caciques of Salinas Grandes 
and, in the decade of 1860, montoneros26. 
In that sense, while the proportion of 
malones in which an ascription is pointed 
out is relatively small, we believe it sounds 
reasonable to assume a more or less direct 
link between the areas affected by a malón 
and the closest indigenous territoriality.
This perspective takes into ac-
count not only the bigger ease, derived 
from closeness, of operating on certain 
points, but also the strategic control of 
tracks, watering holes and resting places 
that had an impact in the success of a 
malón27. However, this should not imply 
the attribution of a whole incursion to a 
particular area to the group that is closest 
as a whole. The control established by 
great caciques over their subordinates was 
not necessarily successful, difficulty that 
shows itself clearly in the correspondence 
of leaders like Calfucurá or the Ranquel 
Mariano Rosas28. Therefore, the incur-
sions in which capitanejos or caciques 
depending on Calfucurá or the Ranquel 
leaders show up were not always a result 
of a policy followed by them. On the 
other side, the leaders could inhibit –or 
try to– the malones in certain points, in 
agreement of the compromises assumed 
with the cristianos, and “derive” those 
groups interested in fighting to other 
areas far from their control in which local 
29 De Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período...” 
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groups weren’t interested in sustaining 
pacific relations in certain contexts29. The 
understanding of these dynamics can only 
be observed indirectly from a perspective 
like the one we have taken in this article. 
However, we will see how some elements 
that vary in respect to the areas affected 
by incursions and to the composition of 
those could point to, besides different 
strategies from Salineros and Ranqueles, 
various alliances between these groups or 
fractions of them, as well as the degree of 
authority of their leaderships. 
We will disaggregate the malones of 
the period in the two big areas that co-
rrespond to the Salinero and the Ranquel 
territories. We have considered the military 
sections of Patagones, Bahía Blanca, Costa 
Sud, South of Buenos Aires and West of 
Buenos Aires as the “Salinero” frontier. 
While these fractions of the frontier vary 
through the period we are covering, their 
movement was essentially inland, keeping 
the subdivisions. Carmen de Patagones, 
by the way, was fundamentally linked to 
the manzaneros . Nevertheless, the malones 
to that location or its area of influence 
in which an ascription was noted refer 
fundamentally to capitanejos or groups 
formally dependent on Calfucurá.
As the “Ranquel” border, we have 
considered the sections of North of Bue-
nos Aires, South of Santa Fe, South and 
Southeast of Córdoba, South of San Luis 
and South de Mendoza, also subject to a 
movement towards indigenous territory 
during those years. We are conscious 
that the inclusion in a single area of this 
group of frontiers could be debatable. 
In its extremes –South of Mendoza and 
North of Buenos Aires– we have included 
sectors of the frontier that were not strictly 
Ranquel areas and that had a significant 
weight of other groups: the Pehuenches of 
the Mendoza south and the autonomous 
group of cacique Pincén, respectively. 
However, we have noted that, in both 
cases, the malones in those spaces are 
usually attributed to the Ranqueles, be it 
by themselves or accompanied by others.
Map Number 1. 
Ranquel and Salinero Frontier
Source: Own elaboration for illustrative purposes
Figure Number 3. 
Malones by area between 1860 and 1875 
Source: Compiled from SHE and MMGM.
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The distribution of malones between 
the Ranquel and Salinero borders during 
the years that go from 1860 to 1875 is, 
then, as shown in Figure Number 3.
30 The malón of which we doubt the Salinero conduction is the one already mentioned in the previous note.  
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We show in this chart only the 
medium-sized and big malones, looking 
to unlink the unarticulated actions of 
small groups and get closer to the political 
strategies of longkos and groups. The first 
observation is that the relative regularity 
year by year that we had pointed out seems 
to no longer be, once the two big areas 
of occurrence have been distinguished.
In the decade of 1860 the biggest 
conflict comes from the Ranquel area, 
which inverts itself briefly during 1870, 
restarting the following year to go back 
to getting smaller consolidating pacific 
bonds towards the end of our period. 
The relative peace in the Salinero frontier 
during the first decade that we analyse is 
a result of the pacific relations sustained 
by the Salinero leadership, which will go 
into a crisis in the decade of 1870. The 
Ranquel groups, on the other hand, only 
entered a peace treaty briefly in 1865 to 
return to pacific conversations only at the 
start of the next decade.
This “mirrored” distribution of the 
indigenous incursions between both areas is 
better seen if we only consider the big ma-
lones –of 500 warriors or more–. This sort 
of “distribution” of the borders between 
the big indigenous groups could indicate 
a unified strategy of the indigenous space, 
directing the malón to different frontiers 
according to the specific political contexts. 
However, attending to the multi-centre 
and competitive nature of indigenous 
society, we believe an explanation of this 
kind would be inadequate.
We understand, instead, that the 
disparity shown by the conflict in the di-
fferent territories could point towards the 
existence of a stable amount of “available” 
warriors to carry out malones in different 
spaces. Both between the Ranquel and 
Salinera groups and between Cordillera-
nos and groups from the Araucanía that 
periodically migrated to the Pampas. It 
would consist of moving the emphasis on 
the groups and the great leaders to put 
it on the less important longkos and the 
conas . We could, in this way, contribute 
to explaining the stability in regards to 
the number of incursions, taking the 
indigenous territory as a unity against the 
notable variation between the different 
areas. This perspective is also consistent 
with those malones on which we have data 
regarding the maloneros’ ascription, given 
that in fact the circulation of fractions 
and leaders of both groups is observable. 
The variation in the number of conas 
in what we call big malones is a lot bigger 
than in the other groups. The two most 
important malones of the period, in 1872 
with around 3700 warriors and in 1875 
with 5000, corresponded to the western 
and southern borders respectively and were 
leaded by the Salineros, allied with other 
groups –Ranqueles and “Chileans” and 
Ranqueles, “Chileans” and indios amigos 
from Azul respectively–. The three malo-
nes that follow in importance, with 2000 
warriors, seem to also have been leaded by 
Salineros, allied with other groups, except 
perhaps in one case30. With 1300 and 1500 
warriors, we note two other malones. One 
of those –in 1864 in the Buenos Aires 
31 SHE, Box 18 Doc. 3231 and MMGM 1866, Annexe G.9-14. 
32 Besides the one already put in doubt that links Coliqueo and Calfucurá in 1868. 
33 In the Ranquel frontier, we registered a single malón that got to 2000 warriors, whose doubtful attribution to Calfucurá 
 was already established in footnote 14. In order of importance, it’s followed by two malones with 1500 warriors in which the 
 participation of Salineros is pointed out: at the south of Santa Fe in June 1862 (SHE, Box 8, 594, 596, 599 and 600) and 
 November 1868 (SHE, Box 27 Doc. 1028, 1029, 1030, 1033, 1034, 1032 and 4805).  With 1000 conas we registered one 
 in Córdoba in November 1865 (SHE, Box 18, 3217 and 3043) and in the south of Santa Fe in April of 1869 (SHE, Box 
 28, Doc. 1062) and May of 1871 (MMGM 1872:8-15), being this probably the biggest number the Ranqueles could mobilize 
 by themselves. In contrast, Salineros were able to mobilize close to 2000 attackers in November 1862 and at least 1300 in April 
 1864 (SHE, box 13, Doc. 561). The coalitions leaded by them, on the other hand, got to the highest points with 2000 conas in October 
 1870 (MMGM 1871:252-254), 3700 in March 1872 (MMGM 1872:102-132) and 5000 in December 1875 (MMGM 1876:15-33).
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south– seems to correspond to Saline-
ros, Cordilleranos and maybe friendly 
Indians31. Of the remaining two, in the 
Santa Fe south, we only have information 
about the ascription on one of them –in 
1862– in which capitanejos of Calfucurá 
leaded by Ranquel caciques, participated. 
The big malones with between 500 and 
1000 warriors, on the other hand, do not 
always show up associated by the sources 
to an alliance between different groups. 
Thereby, in three of them, occurred in 
the “Ranquel frontier”, only these are 
mentioned, or linked to montoneros32. 
Another two, to the Buenos Aires fron-
tiers, are only attributed to Salineros, 
eventually accompanied by “Chileans” 
or Cordilleranos. In another two, lastly, 
both groups seems allied.
Based on the above we will point 
out some issues. Firstly, we confirm the 
circulation of warriors between the Ran-
quel and Salinero areas to participate in 
incursions. Secondly, we note that the 
biggest malones happened in the Salinero 
area, reflecting not only a slightly bigger 
population but also a more accentuated 
capacity of Calfucurá, and afterwards of 
his children, to succeed in making calls 
to war capable of surpassing the thousand 
warriors and to even multiply that number. 
A third aspect is that the Ranquel power, 
when it managed big military mobili-
zations, seems mostly associated to the 
presence of Salinero allies or others. This 
dependence does not seem to have been 
symmetric as long as a similar strength 
to the maximum reached by Ranqueles, 
accompanied by Salineros capitanejos, was 
convened in some occasions exclusively 
by Salineros33. 
Let us get back now to the malones 
we have categorized as “medium-sized”. 
These incursions, as we have sustained, 
did not require neither big caciques nor 
the articulation of different partialities. 
The decision of a secondary cacique with a 
certain ability to convene or of an autono- 
mous group of the great associations was 
enough to carry on an incursion of this 
kind. Same as in the big malones, there 
where the sources attribute these malones 
to some group, it’s the one coinciding with 
the one closest to the frontier the malón 
attacked, even though those who appear as 
leading the maloqueros, when it has been 
registered, are usually less known caciques.
We consider that this low occurrence 
of malones in sectors where the leaders held 
diplomatic relations points to another 
dimension of territorial control on their 
part that we’ve already mentioned: their 
capability to inhibit incursions that could 
put agreements that they had some interest 
34 There are numerous sources that note warnings of the caciques about malones being planned. Among these we mention 
 SHE Box 19, Doc. 981, Box 22 Doc. 927, Box 24 Doc s/n and Box 26 Doc. 1080 and 1079. 
35 MMGM 1868, Annexe F:XVI. 
36 Álvaro Barros, Indios, Fronteras y Seguridad Interior (Buenos Aires: Solar-Hachette, [1875] 1975); Álvaro Barros y Julio Argentino 
 Roca, Sobre el sistema de seguridad interior. Cartas del general D. Julio Argentino Roca y del coronel Alvaro Barros (Buenos Aires: 
 El Nacional, 1876); José Manuel Olascoaga, Estudio Topográfico de la pampa y el río negro (Buenos Aires: Eudeba [1880] 1974).
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in maintaining in danger. This required the 
big caciques to turn to a combination of 
strategies, not always successful, facing the 
difficulty of imposing punitive measures 
against those that did not go along with 
the existing agreements.  These strategies, 
dependent on the parental and reciprocal 
logic of indigenous society, could include 
persuasion, the realisation of feasts and 
the distribution of part of the obtained in 
rations or, with eventual consequences on 
their own authority, the plain collaboration 
with the Christian authorities, warning 
about incursions being planned34 or giving 
back what was obtained35. 
We will resume then our proposal of 
warrior contingents conducted by “avai-
lable” secondary leaders, but we will add 
here the role of the big caciques and their 
variable margins of action to explain the 
particular dynamic of frontier violence. 
Thus, far from an unambiguous strategy, 
the indigenous military policy seems like 
the result of heterogeneous practices, no 
longer only between the main groups 
and cacicatos but in their interiors, that 
required pacts and agreements in order 
to manage articulating different fractions 
for the realisation of malones in different 
points of the frontier. These articulations 
were conditioned by the actuate of big 
caciques, whose margin of action, in turn, 
depended on the capacity to influence 
their followers of lesser hierarchy and on 
the global context of the indigenous space 
against the cristianos. 
the Results of the Malón.
The malones, in their most practical 
sense, were military actions destined to 
the appropriation of goods, particularly 
in the shape of cattle and captives. This 
characteristic is without a doubt central to 
the traditional images on the indigenous 
groups and the justificatory literature about 
the conquest. What was, however, the real 
weight of the extractions of cattle or other 
goods by way of indigenous loots? Some 
figures proposed contemporaneously to 
the validity of the frontier, very unequal 
between them, have usually been taken 
uncritically through the years. Julio A. 
Roca calculated an average of 40.000 
head per year looted in the Pampas and 
subsequently sold in the Chilean markets. 
Some years before, Álvaro Barros had 
elevated that number to 150.000 stolen 
head. Olascoaga36, lastly, rose the number 
to 200.000 head per year. Affirmations 
basing themselves in these rather vague 
calculations still belong to the common 
sense of historiography. 
We have decided to try out a num-
ber more according to the sources of the 
exactions of cattle during the years we are 
analysing. Without a doubt, many of the 
difficulties already perceived, presented 
by the sources, are still present in this 
aspect. Thus, for only 137 malones (76% 
of the total) we have some references on 
the cattle taken by the Indians. These 
references, on the other hand, only in 
some exceptional cases imply a detailed 
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report of the lost cattle. More usually, we 
find an approximate estimation, written 
immediately after the incursion happened. 
As it happened with other aspects, the 
big malones are often richer regarding 
the information provided by the sources. 
The first aspect to take into account 
is that not always did the maloneros ma-
nage to take cattle or often, if they did, 
it was recovered during the chase by the 
troops. On the total of 137 incursions, 
in 63 (46%) it is explicitly pointed out 
that the entirety of the belongings were 
took by the cristianos or that they never 
got to capture any animals. Additionally, 
in numerous incursions the denounced 
looting is quantitatively lacking: some 
tens of animals or expressions like “a small 
drove”, “a herd”, “some” or “the drove of 
horses of the fort”. We consider reasonable, 
too, to assume that those malones where 
the report did not consider it necessary to 
specify the loss of any belongings probably 
correspond to invasions that were not 
successful or at least not very successful. 
In this sense, it is possible to affirm that 
most of the malones failed regarding the 
capture of cattle. 
Of course, this did not always 
happen. In fact, there’s a mention in 
74 malones –54% of the 138 in which 
belongings are mentioned and 41% of 
the total amount– of numbers of animals 
taken by the Indians or of expressions like 
“numerous droves”, “large roundups” or 
“good steal”, that indicate the success of 
the incursion. In these cases, the Indians 
took different quantities of cattle, which 
go from a couple hundred to tens of thou-
sands of head of cattle. Only in 42 of this 
74 successful malones do the sources give 
us concrete estimations of the number of 
animals looted. Basing ourselves on this 
we constructed figure number four, in 
which we’ve considered exclusively the 
cattle that’s noted as effectively taken by 
the maloqueros. That is to say, there where 
a number is mentioned but, in the same 
document or in the subsequent docu-
ments, the values corresponding to the 
recuperation by the Christian troops also 
appear, we have subtracted these last ones.
37 Indeed, more than 30% of the total of the period corresponds to a single malón, while 91% of the cattle taken is explained 
 by merely 7 malones. Ordered by amount of head of cattle stolen, these were: 70,000 in the south and west border of 
 Buenos Aires in 1875; 49,000 in the Costa Sud border in 1879; 30,000 in the south of Buenos Aires in 1865; 20,000 in Córdoba 
 in 1865; 14,200 in Costa Sud in 1864; 12,000 at the same place the following year; and 10,000 in Córdoba in 1866 (Respectively: 
 MMGM 1876:15-33; SHE, Box 32, Doc 1223, 1227 and 18b 5999; SHE, Box 18 Doc. 3217, 9043 and 3231; SHE, Box 
 13, Doc. 550; SHE, Box 18, Doc. 3231, MMGM 1855 Annexe G:9-14; MMGM 1868:37-42). As it is to be expected, in all 
 cases they’re big malones. It is worth noting, at the same time, that most of the cattle stolen corresponds to the province of Buenos Aires.
Source: Compiled from SHE and MMGM.
Figure Number 4. 
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The first thing we can observe is 
that, at least for these fifteen years, the 
amounts of cattle seem to be very far from 
the more conservative estimations we’ve 
quoted. Of course, not having numbers 
on around twenty of successful malones, 
the quantities noted in the graph imply 
an underestimation. However, even if 
we supposed that those on which we 
have no information could duplicate the 
amounts of cattle, only in three of the 
investigated years could we surpass the 
numbers sustained by Roca, being either 
way quite lower than the ones proposed 
by Barros and Olascoaga. Said exercise, 
on the other hand, would probably be an 
exaggeration. For the years in which we 
have effectively observed big steals we have 
identified clearly a very limited number 
of malones of greater magnitude in which 
most of the animals were stolen37. As we 
have pointed out many a time before, 
these are the incursions that, because 
of their significance, have left the most 
documentation. 
The data we have presented is inten-
ded to diminish the economic importance 
of the appropriation of cattle by means 
of malones. While it’s indubitable that 
in some cases it leaded to an important 
flux of goods towards “the inland”, their 
irregularity and inefficiency –expressed in 
the grand majority of cases, in which the 
loot was retrieved by the troops– makes 
it difficult to consider it a central aspect 
38 Sebastián Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá: economía y política del cacicato salinero (1853-1859)” in Amigos, 
 hermanos y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de la pampa oriental (Siglo XIX), edited by Daniel Villar et al. 
 (Bahía Blanca: Centro de Documentación Patagónica – Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2011), 197-217.
39 In five occasions the documents point out the captivity of “a few” or “some”, without mentioning a number. 
40 Towards the end of November, 1866, a big Ranquel invasion to the south of Córdoba took at least 54 captives, subtracting 
 a bigger number that could have been rescued (MMGM 1868 Annexe F:XXXVIII to XLVII). In April of the following 
 year, in the south of Santa Fe, 12 captives (SHE, Box 22, Doc 934 and 935). In July 1868, again in the Santa Fe south 19 
 captives (SHE, Box 26, Doc. 1001 and 1005). In July 1870, in the Buenos Aires south, 24 captives interchanged a couple 
 months later (SHE, Box 32, Doc 1223, 1227, 18b 5999, and 18c 6145; MMGM 1871 Annexe G:216-226). In December of 
 1875 in the Buenos Aires south 500 captives are mentioned (MMGM 1876:15-33). In November 1868 in Mendoza, 100 captives 
 are mentioned. It is the only episode with a big amount of captives that belongs to a “medium-sized” malón (MMGM 1869 Annex G). 
41 In December of 1875 in the Buenos Aires south 500 captives are mentioned (MMGM 1876:15-33). 
42 It was the last malón that our cutting covers and the most numerous of the period. It counted with the participation 
 of both Salineros and Ranqueles, united for the last time in a big coalition, as well as “friendly Indians” of Azul and Tapalqué 
 that lost due to this great rebellion their lands in the frontier and their role as government allies (MMGM 1876:15-33).
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of the indigenous economy. We agree in 
this regard with Alioto38 that the indige-
nous society could not depend on such 
an eventual source of subsistence, in 
addition to the non-strategic nature that 
its subsistence would have entrusted to it.
Another aspect of the success of the 
malones in the Pampas is associated with 
the capture of people and their captivity. 
Unlike with the other data that we have 
tried to systematize, the sources are usua-
lly richer regarding this, being habitual 
for not only the amount of captives in 
a malón to be mentioned but also their 
age, sex and not an ignorable amount 
of times, their names and occupations. 
While we don’t have any way to estimate 
the eventual underreporting we suppose 
this special interest the authorities have 
on giving account of these situations, 
otherwise understandable, could maybe 
imply a more exhaustive record than the 
one we found regarding cattle. Of the 179 
malones we have counted, population or 
soldiers were captured in 30 occasions, 
around 17%. The captivity does not 
seem associated to the magnitude of the 
malones; we can find it in the three types 
we have distinguished, even though, as 
it is expected, we find a bigger number 
in the big malones. In total, during those 
years 757 settlers39 or soldiers were forcibly 
taken to the tolderías, 696 (92%) of which 
correspond to only 5 malones, almost all 
of them “big” malones40, among which 
in only one 500 captives were captured 
(66%)41. The practise of captivity, while 
present, seems then less generalized than 
what might be assumed and is maybe 
associated to particular contexts: not in 
all the incursions, and neither in all the 
big ones, were people being captured. In 
this sense, it could have been an eventual 
practise rather than a systematic one except 
in particular occasions that we will see in 
the next chapter, given that it demands 
delving into contextual aspects that exceed 
the approach we are taking here.
One last aspect of the effects of 
the indigenous incursions remains to be 
considered: the deaths produced in the 
context of the malones. In the same way 
as the captives, these are often registered 
with more detail in the consulted sources, 
because of which we estimate the unde-
rreporting could be a minor problem. We 
have identified 24 malones in which 519 
settlers died, corresponding 400 of those 
–81%– to a single big malón42. Additio-
nally, in 13 malones –that do not overlap 
with the previous ones– 210 soldiers or 
militiamen died, 151 of them in four 
43 In March 1871 an attack of an allied group of Ranqueles and soldiers recently in revolt, took place in the south of Córdoba, 
 and its death toll, the biggest one in the period, was of 65 soldiers and officials, some of whose bodies were mutilated 
 (MMGM:276-280). The second in amount of victims belongs to the big malón –of 3700 warriors– that culminated in the 
 battle of San Carlos in the Buenos Aires south. 4 soldiers and 30 “friendly Indians” were dead in combat, while the maloneros 
 lost around 200 men (MMGM 1872:102-132, SHE Box 35 Doc. 20 7476 and 20 6488) A few months afterwards and not far from 
 there, a party of 21 soldiers that was chasing a group of maloneros was surrounded, all their members dying (MMGM 1873:191-131).
44 The sources we have consulted do not allow us to try a comparable counting with the prisoners and dead indigenous 
 people, be it in the context of malones or in punitive expeditions on the tolderías. The military communications are not usually 
 detailed in that regard and, on the other hand, the indigenous practise of taking the cadavers of their companions with 
 them would make an approximation of that kind very difficult. However, it seems obvious that cristiana violence was greater.
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occasions only43. Thus, in the same way 
that we observed regarding captivity, the 
murder of settlers or the death of armed 
enemies doesn’t seem to show systemati-
city, be it because that wasn’t the central 
objective of the malón or because their 
own nature –the appropriation of goods 
followed by a quick fleeing, trying to 
avoid the confrontation– contributed to 
avoid them44. 
fInAl consIdeRAtIons
In this article, we set ourselves to ela-
borate a systematization of the indigenous 
incursions during the period, trusting that 
it would allow the presentation of a more 
adjusted image than the one elaborated by 
the traditional historiography. Now is the 
moment to lay down some conclusions 
at which we have arrived or, at least, hy-
potheses that seem consistent with what 
we have been showing until now.
The economical and human effects 
of the indigenous incursions have shown 
to be, while relevant, a lot less significant 
than they are habitually described as. At 
least for the period we have considered, 
most of the malones were not successful 
in their capture of cattle, be it because 
they were discovered before they could 
appropriate it or because they lost it during 
the later flee. The image of thousands of 
head of cattle flowing towards indigenous 
territory should probably be revised or 
narrowed to particular situations and, 
in any case, it was below the habitually 
postulated numbers by a big margin. 
However, approximately a third of the 
incursions were successful and their im-
portance in indigenous economy, while 
hard to evaluate, was probably significant. 
We believe, nevertheless, that this way of 
introduction of cattle in the indigenous 
commercial circles could not have consti-
tuted a constant flow capable of sustaining 
them by itself, rather contributing as an 
additional resource whose foreseeability 
turns out to be clearly uncontrollable. 
Regarding captivity and death, we 
have observed that they do not seem to 
show the systematicity one might assume. 
The final number, by the way, does not 
become any less significant because of it. 
The fact that it is encapsulated in isolated 
situations indicates a rationed nature of 
these ways of violence, very different 
between them by the way. 
Between 1860 and 1875 we have 
registered a total of 179 malones that 
happened in a relatively regular fashion 
with little over 10 incursions per year. 
This regularity kept being observed in 
the “medium-sized” and “big” malones. 
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The small incursions, they seem to have 
dominated over the malones of bigger 
importance during this whole period. 
We believe that these kinds of actions 
seem difficult to distinguish from other 
phenomena of illegal appropriation of 
cattle, typical of the frontier spaces, which 
involved both the indigenous population 
and the cristiana one. That was possibly 
linked with the local informal circuits 
of cattle trade, which was habitually de-
nounced in sources of the time pointing 
out the participation of diverse frontier 
actors in them, such as traders, gatherers 
and civil and military authorities.
The malones we have named “me-
dium-sized” and “big” show a relative 
regularity if we take into account the 
Southern Frontier as a whole. This image, 
in which we observe relevant malones in 
all years, consistent with the traditional 
image of permanent violence unfolding in 
the frontiers, is noticeably modified when 
we start to distinguish different areas and 
frontier sections. Once we have done that, 
we observe a significant heterogeneity 
between very conflicting sectors against 
those where we do not register important 
incursions. The conflictive areas, on the 
other hand, are not usually superposed 
in the same year, making it so that while 
a sector of the indigenous frontier shows 
important malones, the usual is for the 
situation in the other sectors to be a 
peaceful one.
This distribution of the indigenous 
malones, constant on the borders as a 
whole, but alternated between different 
sections of the same, in line with diffe-
rentiated policies of the big cacicatos, 
could allow supposing a homogeneous 
strategy arranged by the combination 
of the indigenous groups. We believe, 
however, that a different explanation 
would be more accurate. The perspective 
of a unified indigenous strategy, besides 
being contradictory with what we know of 
the indigenous political structure, clashes 
with the strategies deployed by the great 
caciques to sustain pacific relationships 
there were that was the followed policy. 
We have observed a sort of division 
of the indigenous borders, “Salinero” 
and “Ranquel”, according to which 
the incursions in one or the other were 
leaded in almost all cases by leaders or 
associations belonging to the closest 
group, reflecting not only the closeness 
but also the knowledge and control of 
tracks and other strategic spaces.  Other 
participant groups –Pampeanos and 
extra-Pampeanos– in one or other area, 
did it in the role of subordinates, with a 
certain asymmetry of Salinero power in 
contrast with the Ranquel, in relation to 
their ability to convene. This points to a 
recognized territoriality that extended to 
the points of maloneo over the Christian 
populations.
However, this territoriality, funda-
mental to the violent incursions, also had 
significance in the sustaining of the peace. 
Thus, the main caciques showed a big in-
terest in maintaining the peace on those 
points in which they received rations or 
maintained commercial relations. For this 
to happen they had to resort to different 
strategies that we have mentioned here. 
The few important malones in the Salinero 
frontier during the most part of the decade 
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of 1860 and the Ranquel frontier starting 
on 1872 show that they were relatively 
successful. Between these strategies we’ll 
mention fundamentally the “detour” of 
warriors interested in malonear towards 
other frontiers where the local contexts 
allowed violence without putting at risk 
the equilibrium reached by the caciques 
in their areas of influence. 
Nevertheless, it is possible as well 
to move the focus from the great longkos 
and put it on the secondary caciques and 
capitanejos, capable of organizing and 
effectuating “medium-sized” incursions, 
or adding themselves to major ones inde-
pendently of their formal leaders. Thus we 
can imagine a significant but difficult to 
determine number of secondary leaders and 
conas “available” to participate in attacks 
on different points of the frontier, going 
through the limits of the partialities, that 
were by themselves weak, according to 
the diverse political contexts in which the 
main caciques could or would want to call 
them.  These “second lines” of indigenous 
military power would permit explaining 
the stability of malón violence without 
postulating a unified strategy of the big 
leaderships. Thereby, from our perspective, 
the relative regularity of the indigenous 
incursions between 1860 and 1875, far 
from expressing a homogeneous policy 
of aggression or resistance could instead 
be a result of the limits that indigenous 
policies put in the nature of leadership. 
souRces
Memorias del Ministerio de Guerra 
y Marina, years 1863-1876.
Fondo Fronteras con los Indios, 
Servicio Histórico del Ejército, boxes five 
to thirty nine.
Barros Álvaro [1872]. 1975. Fron-
teras y territorios federales de las Pampas del 
sur. Buenos Aires: Solar-Hachette.
Barros Álvaro [1875]. 1975. Fron-
teras y Seguridad Interior. Buenos Aires: 
Solar-Hachette.
Barros Álvaro y Julio Argentino 
Roca. 1876. Sobre el sistema de seguridad 
interior. Cartas del general D. Julio Argentino 
Roca y del coronel Álvaro Barros. Buenos 
Aires: El Nacional.
Olascoaga, José Manuel. [1880] 
1974. Estudio Topográfico de La Pampa y 
el Río Negro. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
bIblIogRAPhy
Alioto, Sebastián. 2011. Indios y 
ganado en la frontera. La ruta del río Negro 
(1750-1830). Rosario: Prohistoria.
Alioto, Sebastián. 2011. “Las yeguas 
y las chacras de Calfucurá: economía y 
política del cacicato salinero (1853-1859)” 
in Amigos, hermanos y parientes. Líderes y 
liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de la 
pampa oriental (Siglo XIX), Villar D. and 
Jiménez J. (ed). Bahía Blanca: Centro de 
Documentación Patagónica – Departa-
99
Guido Cordero.
Año 10 / N°19 / julio-diciembre 2019.
mento de Humanidades, Universidad 
Nacional del Sur, 197-217.
Alioto, Sebastián and Juan Francis-
co Jiménez. 2011. “Transcripción de los 
apuntes de Zeballos con notas sobre su 
contenido y léxico”, in Amigos, hermanos 
y parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Socie-
dades Indígenas de la pampa oriental (Siglo 
XIX), Villar D. and Jiménez J. (ed). Bahía 
Blanca: Centro de Documentación Pata-
gónica – Departamento de Humanidades, 
Universidad Nacional del Sur.
Bechis, Martha. 2008. Piezas de 
Etnohistoria del sur sudamericano. Madrid: 
CSIC.
Bechis, Martha. 2011. Piezas de 
Etnohistoria y de antropología histórica. 
Buenos Aires: SAA.
Boccara, Guillaume. 2007. Los 
vencedores: historia del pueblo Mapuche en 
la época colonial. San Pedro de Atacama: 
IIAM.
Cordero, Guido. 2019. Malón y 
política. Loncos y weichafes en la frontera 
sur (1860-1875). Rosario: Prohistoria 
Ediciones. 
Crivelli Montero, E. 1991. “Malón, 
¿Saqueo o estrategia?”, in Revista Todo es 
Historia 283 (Buenos Aires): 6-32. 
De Jong, Ingrid. 2011. “Las alianza 
políticas indígenas en el período de la or-
ganización nacional.”, in De los cacicazgos 
a la ciudadanía. Sistemas políticos en la 
frontera, siglos XVIII-XIX, Quijada, M. 
(ed). Berlín: Gebr Mann Verlag.
De Jong, Ingrid. 2016. “Entre 
el malón, el comercio y la diplomacia: 
Dinámicas de la política indígena en las 
fronteras pampeanas. Siglos XVIII y XIX. 
Un balance historiográfico”. In Revista 
Tiempo Histórico 6/11 (Santiago):17-40. 
http://bibliotecadigital.academia.cl/hand-
le/123456789/3680
De Jong, Ingrid y Guido Cordero. 
2017. “El malón en contrapunto: diná-
micas de la diplomacia, el comercio y la 
guerra en la Frontera Sur (siglos XVIII y 
XIX)”, in La larga historia de los saqueos 
en la Argentina. De la Independencia hasta 
nuestros días, Gabriel Di Meglio y Sergio 
Serulnikov, (comps), 63-89. Buenos Aires: 
Siglo XXI. 
León Solís, Leonardo. 1995-1996. 
“Conflictos de poder y guerras tribales en 
Araucanía y Las Pampas: La batalla de 
Tromen (1774)”, in Historia 29 (Santiago): 
185-233.
León Solís, Leonardo. 1990. Malo-
neros y conchavadores en la Araucanía y las 
Pampas. 1780-1800. Temuco: Universidad 
de la Frontera.
Mandrini, Raúl. 1987. “La agri-
cultura indígena en la región pampeana 
y sus adyacencias (siglos XVIII-XIX)”, 
in Anuario del IEHS 1 (Tandil): 11-43.
Mandrini, Raúl. 1988. “Desarrollo 
de una sociedad indígena pastoril en el 
área interserrana bonaerense”, in Anuario 
del IEHS 2 (Tandil): 71-98.
Mandrini, Raul. 1994. “Las trans-
formaciones de la economía indígena 
bonaerense (ca. 1600-1820)”, en Huellas 
en la tierra. Indios, agricultores y hacendados 
100
The return of the malón. A quantitative...
Revista tiempo HistóRico
en la pampa bonaerenss, 45-74, R. Man-
drini y A. Reguera (eds.). Tandil: IEHS/
UNCPBA.
Mandrini, Raul 1994. “¿Sólo de caza 
y robos vivían los indios? La organización 
económica de los cacicatos pampeanos del 
siglo xix”, in Siglo xix. Revista de Historia. 
2a época, 15 (México): 5-24.
Tamagnini, M. and G. Perez Zavala. 
2010. El fondo de la tierra. Destinos errantes 
en la frontera sur. Río Cuarto: Editorial 
de la URC.
Pinto Rodríguez, Jorge. 2000. De 
la inclusión a la exclusión. La formación 
del estado, la nación y el pueblo Mapuche. 
Santiago: Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
Ras, Norberto. 2007. La guerra por 
las vacas. Buenos Aires: Galerna.
Villar D. and J. Jiménez. 2003. 
“La tempestad de la guerra: conflictos 
indígenas y circuitos de intercambio”, 
in Las fronteras hispanocriollas del mundo 
indígena latinoamericano en los siglos XVIII 
y XIX. Mandrini R. et al. Neuquén, Bahía 
Blanca, Tandil: UNC, UNS, UniCen.
Villar, D. and J.F. Jiménez. 2011. 
“Amigos, hermanos y parientes. Líderes y 
liderados en las Sociedades Indígenas de 
la Pampa Oriental (1820-1840). Etnogé-
nesis Llailmache”, in Amigos, hermanos y 
parientes. Líderes y liderados en las Sociedades 
Indígenas de la Pampa Oriental (S. XIX), 
Villar and Jiménez (ed.). Bahía Blanca: 
CDP-UNS.
Vezub, Julio. 2009. Valentín Saygüeque 
y la Gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas. 
Poder y etnicidad en la Patagonia Septen-
trional. Buenos Aires: Prometeo libros.
Whalter, Juan Carlos. [1949] 1973. 
La conquista del desierto. Buenos Aires: 
Eudeba.
Zeballos, Estanislao. [1878] 2008. 
La conquista de 15.000 leguas. Ensayo para 
la ocupación definitiva de la Patagonia. 
Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente.
